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INTRODUCTION
The facts leading up to Garcia v. Google (Garcia I),1 a Ninth
Circuit case reheard en banc (Garcia II),2 were just as strange as
the effects of the original ruling. A casting call had been posted online for a film described as a “historical desert drama set in the
Middle East”3 about a man named George and his gang of warriors.4 It was not until after the video was posted on YouTube, did
the actors learn the true significance of the film. The film ended up
being a fourteen minute anti-Islamic trailer, portraying the prophet
Muhammad as a womanizer, pedophile, and murderer.5
The filmmaker intentionally deceived the actors.6 He caused
them emotional distress and even invaded the actors’ privacy.7 Ultimately, one of the actors, Cindy Lee Garcia, and her attorney relied on a copyright claim in federal court to seek a motion for a pre-

1

Garcia v. Google (Garcia I), 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 733
(9th Cir. 2015).
2
See Garcia v. Google (Garcia II), 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
3
Adrian Chen, “It Makes Me Sick”: Actress in Muhammed Movie Says She Was
Deceived, Had No Idea It Was About Islam, GAWKER (Sept. 12, 2012, 5:29 PM),
http://gawker.com/5942748/it-makes-me-sick-actress-in-muhammed-movie-says-shewas-deceived-had-no-idea-it-was-about-islam [http://perma.cc/482F-E9CB].
4
See Michael Joseph Gross, Disaster Movie, VANITY FAIR (Dec. 27, 2012, 12:00 AM),
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2012/12/making-of-innocence-of-muslims
[http://perma.cc/M2H6-7Z35].
5
See id.
6
Serge F. Kovaleski & Brooks Barnes, From Man Who Insulted Muhammad, No Regret,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/us/from-the-manwho-insulted-islam-no-retreat.html [http://perma.cc/DJ3D-74DM].
7
Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015).
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liminary injunction to have Google remove the film from YouTube.8
However, although Garcia had suffered harm, such as receiving
death threats,9 the harms she had suffered cannot be appropriately
remedied by copyright law. “Although we do not take lightly
threats to life or the emotional turmoil Garcia has endured, her
harms are untethered from—and incompatible with—copyright
and copyright’s function as the engine of expression.”10 Authors
cannot seek claims for emotional distress, defamation, or privacy
by filing claims under copyright law.11
“Privacy laws, not copyright, may offer remedies tailored to
Garcia’s personal and reputational harms.”12 Plaintiffs have attempted to use copyright law to resolve their issues, where privacy
law would offer the best and most appropriate remedy to their
harm. For example, there are individuals who want photos removed from websites because they have suffered privacy harms or
they have suffered emotional distress. These individuals may attempt to use copyright law to have the photos removed, even
though they have not suffered any harm related to the infringement
of their copyright.
This Note will investigate how individuals attempt to use copyright law, instead of seeking damages for emotional distress or privacy, by using Garcia I and Garcia II as examples. Part I will provide background on Garcia I and Garcia II, the facts leading up to
the lawsuit, the first decision and the criticism surrounding it, and
the second decision. Part II will discuss what other legal methods
Garcia may have used to achieve the same result and potentially
obtain the same relief if she decided not to sue for copyright infringement. Part III will look beyond Garcia I and Garcia II at other
types of situations where plaintiffs feel their best legal strategy is to
sue for copyright infringement, even though their suits are more
akin to defamation or privacy lawsuits, as a result of the protections
for online hosts created by the Communications Decency Act.
8
9
10
11
12

Id.
Id. at 932–33.
Garcia II, 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
See id.
See id.

466

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:463

I. GARCIA V. GOOGLE
A. Background Facts
In 2011, Cindy Lee Garcia was featured in the film Desert Warrior for five minutes; a film she and her co-actors believed would be
an Arabian “action-adventure movie.”13 Prior to shooting the film,
she received only four pages of script and roughly $500 from the
film’s screenwriter and producer, who referred to himself as Sam
Bacile (real name Mark Basseley Youssef).14
It was only after the video had been posted on YouTube that
the actors learned what Youssef had done and, as a result, how
strongly the Islamic community had reacted to the newly titled Innocence of Muslims. Youssef had partially dubbed over the actors’
lines, making it appear as though Garcia was asking, “Is your Mohammed a child molester?”15 The film had been described as
“clearly designed to offend Muslims, portraying Mohammed as a
bloodthirsty murderer and Lothario and pedophile with omnidirectional sexual appetites.”16 Youssef admitted to creating the film as
an open expression of his hatred of Islam and intentionally tricking
the actors to help him create it.17
In 2012, an Egyptian cleric used a clip of the film on his television show sparking outrage and protests in Cairo.18 The protests
spread to Yemen, Morocco, Iran, Tunisia, Sudan, Iraq, Pakistan,
Lebanon, Libya, Indonesia, and Malaysia.19 Those involved with
the film received death threats and went into hiding.20 Garcia also

13

See Gross, supra note 4.
See Gross, supra note 4. Youssef goes by several names, including his birth name
Nakoula Basseley Nakoula, but the Ninth Circuit uses Youssef. See Garcia I, 766 F.3d at
932.
15
See id.
16
Gross, supra note 4.
17
See Kovaleski & Barnes, supra note 6.
18
David D. Kirkpatrick, A Deadly Mix in Benghazi, Chapter 4: A Fuse Is Lit, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec.
28,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi/#/?chapt=3
[http://perma.cc/ZE4F-R2CB].
19
Id.
20
See Gross, supra note 4.
14
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claims she was made the subject of the cleric’s fatwa “against anyone associated with Innocence of Muslims.”21
Garcia filed several Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”)22 takedown notices, which Google resisted.23 In September 2012, Garcia brought suit against Youssef and Google seeking a restraining order, which would require Google to remove Innocence of Muslims from YouTube.24 The district court denied her
request for a preliminary injunction because Garcia had delayed in
bringing the action.25 The district court also found that Garcia had
not established a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim
because she is not considered an “author” under the Copyright
Act and precedent,26 and, even if she did own a copyright interest
in her own performance, she had granted the film’s author implied
consent to use the performance.27 Garcia ultimately appealed the
preliminary injunction ruling to the Ninth Circuit.28
B. Garcia I
On appeal, Judge Alex Kozinski, writing for a two-to-one majority, issued an order granting Garcia’s motion for a preliminary
injunction. The court’s decision addressed three points: whether
Garcia could retain a copyrightable interest in her performance,
whether she had granted an implied license to Youssef to use her
performance, and whether she is likely to show irreparable harm.
1. Garcia Has a Copyrightable Interest
In ordering Google to take the film down, the Ninth Circuit
held that Garcia’s performance is independently copyrightable.29
21

Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 10, Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 1257302).
22
See infra Part II.B. for a discussion on DMCA takedown notices.
23
Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 932.
24
See id.
25
Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, Garcia v. Nakoula,
No. 12-cv-08315-MWF-VBK (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012).
26
See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000); see also infra
Part I.B.
27
See Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 25, at 3.
28
Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929.
29
See id. at 940; see also Rebecca Tushnet, My Long, Sad Garcia v. Google Blog Post,
REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (Mar. 17, 2014), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2014/03/
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Judge Kozinski found that Garcia could retain a copyrightable interest in her own contribution to the film. Garcia admitted that she
was not a joint author.30 However, the court concluded that she
could still be an author in her own performance, even if she is not a
joint author of the whole film.31 The majority held that her contribution was sufficient to make her an author of her own performance because an actor does more than simply speak the words on
a page.32 Otherwise, Judge Kozinski wrote, “every shmuck . . . is an
actor because everyone . . . knows how to read.”33 He wrote that it
did not matter that Youssef had written the dialogue, managed all
aspects of the production, and later dubbed over a portion of her
scene.34 The majority also noted that Garcia does not own an interest in the entire scene, just her contribution, albeit minor.35 The
court concluded that an individual could still make a copyrightable
contribution and not become a joint author of the whole work.36
In opposition, the dissent asserted that the majority erred in
holding that Garcia has a copyright interest in her performance.37
The dissent argued Garcia’s performance is not protected under
the Copyright Act because (1) it is not a “work,” (2) she is not an
author, and (3) the performance is too personal to be fixed.38 Additionally, it stated that Garcia’s claim is better characterized as one
of a joint work.39 The dissent wrote that, as Garcia was not the orimy-long-sad-garcia-v-google-post.html
[http://perma.cc/HFE5-R9WV]
(providing
further analysis on the holding of Garcia).
30
See Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 933.
31
See id. at 933–34.
32
See id. at 934.
33
See id. at 934 (quoting SANFORD MEISNER & DENNIS LONGWELL, SANFORD MEISNER
ON ACTING 178 (1987)).
34
See id.
35
See id. at 935.
36
See id. at 934.
37
See id. at 941 (Smith, J., dissenting).
38
See id.
39
See id. at 942–44. The dissent uses Aalmuhammed v. Lee to show that Garcia does not
qualify as an author because her contribution was minimal and she was not the originator
of the ideas or concepts. See id. In Aalmuhammed, the Ninth Circuit rejected a
consultant’s claim of co-authorship of a joint work because his contributions to the film,
although valuable, were not enough for co-authorship. See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202
F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2000). The court said that to be an author “requires more than a
minimal creative or original contribution to the work.” See id. (quoting Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1883)). However, the majority ultimately
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ginator of the ideas or concepts (she simply acted them out), she is
not the author.40
2. Implied License
Additionally, the court found that Garcia had granted an implied license to Youssef to use her performance in the film.41 The
majority held that implied licenses must be construed broadly, otherwise actors would possess an excessive amount of control over
the films they starred in, especially if the film failed to meet the actor’s “ex ante expectations.”42 However, the court found that an
implied license is not unlimited.43 Judge Kozinski wrote that Youssef exceeded the bounds of the license through his deceit and lies.44
Further, “[t]he film differs so radically from anything Garcia could
have imagined when she was cast that it can’t possibly be authorized by any implied license she granted Youssef.”45 Therefore,
Innocence of Muslims itself is an infringing use of the implied license.46
3. Irreparable Harm and Injunctions
The majority discussed the finding of irreparable harm through
both the damage to Garcia’s reputation and through the death
threats she received.47 It is possible for “unreasonable delay [to]
defeat irreparable injury.”48 The court found that even though
Garcia took action only when she began to receive death threats,

found that Aalmuhammed did not apply here because the case was about joint authorship
over an entire work. See Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 934. The court concluded that an individual
could still make a copyrightable contribution and not become a joint author of the work in
its entirety. See id.
40
See id. at 943 (Smith, J., dissenting).
41
See id. at 937 (majority opinion).
42
See id.
43
See id.
44
See id.
45
Id.
46
See id. at 938.
47
See id. at 938–39.
48
See Garcia II, 786 F.3d 733, 734 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting 4 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.06[A][3][c] (2002)).
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and not earlier when she first discovered the video,49 her actions
were still reasonable and the issuing of an order to remove the film
from YouTube would have enough of an effect on the death threats
Garcia received to justify the injunction.50 The court stated that:
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must
show that: (1) she is likely to succeed on the merits,
(2) she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in her favor, and (4) an injunction is in the
public interest.51
Here, the majority found a likelihood of success on the merits
(Garcia’s performance gives her a claim in copyright) and it found
she suffered some irreparable harm. Accordingly, the court directed Google to “take down all copies of Innocence of Muslims from
YouTube and any other platforms within its control and to take all
reasonable steps to prevent further uploads.”52
The dissent reminded the court that mandatory injunctions are
particularly disfavored and should be subject to a higher degree of
scrutiny.53 As “Garcia seeks a mandatory injunction, she must establish that the law and facts clearly favor her position, not simply
that she is likely to succeed.”54 The dissent also disagreed with the
majority and found that since Garcia delayed in bringing suit, she
had not demonstrated how she would continue to suffer irreparable
harm.55
Last, the dissent included a discussion on balancing the equities.56 The dissent argued that the balancing of the equities does
not favor Garcia. It wrote that the injunction burdens Google, who
is not a party to Youssef’s actions, and it burdens free expression,
49

See id. (“Garcia waited months to seek an injunction after Innocence of Muslims was
uploaded to YouTube in July 2012; she did not seek emergency relief when the film first
surfaced on the Internet.”).
50
See Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 938–39.
51
Garcia II, 786 F.3d at 740; Farris v. Seabrook, 677 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2012)
(citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Counsel, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).
52
See Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 940.
53
See id. at 940 (quoting Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1994)).
54
See Garcia II, 786 F.3d at 740.
55
See Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 947 (Smith, J., dissenting).
56
See id. at 948.
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whereas, Garcia’s copyright interest is not guaranteed, but rather
“potential.”57 Therefore, the dissent concluded that there was no
abuse of discretion in the district court holding that Garcia would
not likely succeed on the merits of her claim and should not be
granted a preliminary mandatory injunction.58
4. Amended Opinion
On July 11th, 2014, the court filed an amended opinion,59 adding deliberations on the Copyright Office’s refusal to register Garcia’s copyright60 and addressing the lack of discussion of any fair
use defense.61 The Copyright Office refused Garcia’s application to
register a copyright in her own performance and stated that actor’s
performances in motion pictures are a part of the motion picture
and not a separable claim. The court also added that the majority
opinion did not preclude the district court from finding that Garcia
does not have a copyrightable interest in her performance on remand.62 The dissent amended its opinion, as well, expanding its
discussion to include first amendment concerns.63
C. Criticism of Garcia I
Judge Kozinski’s majority opinion in Garcia I attracted intense
criticism, primarily on his interpretation of Garcia’s copyright interest.64 Most criticism resulted from the worry that third-party
57

See id.
See id. at 949.
59
Order and Amended Opinion, Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302). The dissent
also amended its opinion, albeit minimally.
60
See Brief of Defendants-Appellees at Addendum 46, Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 1257302).
61
See Alison Frankel, Kozinski Amends Opinion in 9th Circuit ‘Innocence’ Case v. Google,
REUTERS (July 15, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/07/15/kozinskiamends-opinion-in-9th-circuit-innocence-case-v-google/ [http://perma.cc/53DH-2F4T].
62
See Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 935.
63
For example, Judge Smith added a quote from the case Winter v. Natural Resources
Defense Council Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). See Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 948–49 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
64
See, e.g., Corynne McSherry, Bad Facts, Really Bad Law: Court Orders Google to
Censor Controversial Video Based on Spurious Copyright Claim, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (Feb. 26, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/bad-facts-really-badlaw-court-orders-google-censor-controversial-video-based
[http://perma.cc/NZ7AXVR8] (arguing that Garcia’s copyright claim is questionable and that an injunction that
58
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distributors and Internet publishers would not have the resources
or the capability to determine whether an actor had a copyright interest in their own performance in a film.65 Critics were concerned
that Internet publishers may be forced to err on the side of those
asserting their copyright rights, chilling more speech than should
have to be removed, and placing a burden on websites that do not
have the resources or the skills to remove content from their sites.
Other critics addressed the potential effect the ruling may have
on the entertainment industry, especially the effect on smallbudget amateur films or documentaries.66 There was also concern
for the potential effect on films where the lines of consent might be
murky, for example where documentaries mislead their subjects in
order to create their art.67 In addition, there might be a heavier reliance on contracts for actors in the future; even though critics are
currently concerned with the fact that movies generally do not contract with actors who played miniscule roles in the film. Movies
with extremely large casts would have difficulty keeping track of all
the actors who could claim a copyright in their performance.68 The
court attempted to address this problem in the amended opinion by
stating that these problems would rarely occur since “the vast majority of films are covered by contract, the work for hire doctrine,
or implied licenses.”69
However, Judge Kozinski is not without his supporters. For example, some have argued that the Garcia I decision is legally corsuppresses speech should be heavily scrutinized); Schuyler M. Moore, Garcia v. Google:
Hard Cases Make Bad Law, HUFFINGTON POST (May 5, 2014), http://www.huffington
post.com/schuyler-m-moore/garcia-v-google-hard-case_b_4900376.html
[http://perma.cc/D26Q-M3JR] (arguing the holding was wrong and the court should
have used right of publicity); Tushnet, supra note 29.
65
Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 60, at 38.
66
Id.
67
See Roger Parloff, 11 Judges to Rehear Case Between Google and Actress with Fatwa on
Her Head, FORTUNE (Dec. 11, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/12/11/google-appeals-infatwa-case/ [http://perma.cc/TSF5-PCGA]; see also Jonathan Handel, Hollywood Experts
Divided on Implications of ‘Muslims’ Ruling, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 28, 2014),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/hollywood-experts-divided-implicationsmuslims-684607 [http://perma.cc/TV33-CLB4].
68
See Garcia II, 786 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (using Lord of the Rings as
an example of a movie that has twenty thousand extras).
69
Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir.
2015).
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rect or that, given the unusual fact pattern, the ruling ultimately
created the best outcome.70 Actor and musician associations, in
particular, expressed their approval, as these associations support
the protection of actors’ originality.71
Both sides were given an opportunity to set forth their positions
when Google petitioned for a rehearing en banc.72 Twelve amicus
briefs were submitted in support for or opposition to the rehearing,
including briefs by Netflix,73 Adobe,74 News Organizations,75 intellectual property law professors,76 and the Screen Actors Guild.77
D. Garcia II
In November 2012, the court granted Google’s petition for a
rehearing en banc.78 Oral arguments were held on December 15,
2014 in front of a panel of eleven Ninth Circuit federal judges, and
in May 2015 an opinion was issued.79 The en banc court affirmed
70

See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Copyright Meets “Innocence Of Muslims”: Ninth Circuit
Orders Removal of Movie from YouTube, on Copyright Grounds, WASH. POST (Feb. 26,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/26/
copyright-meets-innocence-of-muslims-ninth-circuit-orders-removal-of-movie-fromyoutube-on-copyright-grounds/ [http://perma.cc/7MQS-QY7X] (agreeing with the
majority opinion, but arguing that Google has a fair use defense); see also Handel, supra
note 67 (interviewing several law professors and entertainment lawyers who agree with
the ruling).
71
See generally Bill Chappell, Google Wins Copyright and Speech Case over ‘Innocence Of
Muslims’ Video, NPR (May 18, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/
05/18/407732594/google-wins-copyright-and-speech-case-over-innocence-of-muslimsvideo [http://perma.cc/NL84-XB5K].
72
Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302).
73
Brief for Netflix, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees, Garcia I,
766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302) (arguing the reworking of copyright law hurts Netflix and
other similar distributors).
74
Brief for Adobe Systems et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees,
Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302) (arguing the holding burdens online services and
third-party distributors).
75
Brief for News Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees,
Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302) (discussing First Amendment implications).
76
Brief for Professors of Intellectual Property Law as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendants-Appellees, Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302) (addressing the court’s use
of copyright law).
77
Brief for Screen Actors Guild et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant,
Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302).
78
See Order Granting En Banc Rehearing, Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302).
79
Id.; see also Garcia II, 786 F.3d 733, 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
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the district court’s opinion, holding that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a mandatory injunction.80
The majority wrote: “In this case, a heartfelt plea for personal
protection is juxtaposed with the limits of copyright law and fundamental principles of free speech. The appeal teaches a simple
lesson—a weak copyright claim cannot justify censorship in the
guise of authorship.”81 The majority went on to point out that Garcia did not have a copyright claim because her performance was not
fixed in a tangible medium, rather it is the role of the filmmaker to
create the fixation of the performance.82
The majority also addressed the issue of irreparable harm.83
The majority stated that Garcia had not demonstrated that she had
suffered an irreparable harm as she had delayed before she sought
an injunction.84 Additionally, any harm she had suffered “did not
stem from copyright”85 and “Garcia’s harms are too attenuated
from the purpose of copyright.”86 This time Judge Kozinski, the
author of the original majority opinion, dissented and reiterated
much of his original opinion.87
II. GARCIA’S POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE LEGAL OPTIONS
Garcia initially began her lawsuit in state court, where she did
not bring any claims under copyright law.88 Garcia, in her complaint filed in district court, brought claims of: copyright infringement, fraud, unfair business practices, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.89 She left out a claim of right of publicity

80

Id. at 734.
Id. at 736.
82
See id. at 740–41.
83
See id. at 744–46.
84
See id. at 746.
85
Id. at 744.
86
Id. at 746.
87
See id. at 749–53 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
88
Complaint, Garcia v. Nakoula, No. BC492358 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 2012).
89
Complaint, Garcia v. Nakoula, No. 12-cv-08315-MWF-VBK (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26,
2012).
81
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(which she had previously included in her complaint filed in state
court).90
Garcia’s choice to file a copyright lawsuit in federal court was
strategic for a number of reasons. Yet, she should have filed a lawsuit in state court on tort claims, such as fraud. She would have had
a high likelihood of success based on the facts of the case and the
sympathy the court has expressed for her extremely unfortunate
situation thus far.91 The issue, however, is that the relief she received in federal court may not be the same or even similar to what
she would have received in state court. This Part will discuss why
Garcia pursued a copyright claim by addressing what type of relief
Garcia might want, what types of potential legal methods were
available to her, and how said legal methods act within the framework of copyright law.
A. What Relief Does Garcia Want?
As was made clear by her request for a temporary restraining
order, Garcia wanted the film removed from YouTube.92 Yet, by
bringing a lawsuit against Youssef alone, there are different types of
relief Garcia could seek and these goals would affect how she
shapes her lawsuit.
First and foremost, Garcia wanted the video taken off the Internet and completely prevented from being re-uploaded. Google
argued that it would be impossible to comply with the order.93 The
Ninth Circuit took some steps to prevent rush downloading of the
film by prohibiting publication of the injunction.94 However,
Google also noted in its brief that the film is available on other video hosting websites and “those who wish to proliferate the film
have ample copies to work from.”95 Even the district court felt that

90

Complaint, supra note 88. Garcia voluntarily withdrew her lawsuit in California state
court after a judge found she had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits.
91
See, e.g., Moore, supra note 64 (stating that judges sometimes “rule with their
hearts”).
92
See Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir.
2015).
93
Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 60, at 12.
94
Id.
95
Id.
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Garcia waited too long before bringing suit to prevent harm.96 That
being said, the amount of influence YouTube has, as one of the
largest websites, cannot be ignored.97 Therefore, only removing it
from that platform would still have a great effect.
Reaching a defendant like Youssef might prove to be more difficult. Youssef goes by multiple aliases and constantly changes his
name.98 At the time the lawsuit began, he was in prison for violating parole on a prior conviction for bank fraud.99 Youssef had already allegedly spent $80,000 on Innocence of Muslims, which he
received from ex-family members and donations.100 A plaintiff
should consider a cost-benefit analysis before going through the
expense and trials of a lawsuit, with regards to what the potential
rewards might be with respects to a potential defendant.
Another incentive to bringing a lawsuit is the possibility of repairing Garcia’s reputation. By coming forward and bringing the
lawsuit, Garcia can publicly denounce and distance herself from
the film and its violence towards Islam. She was one of the few actors in the film to come out publicly against the film; other actors
went into hiding.101 These lawsuits could be more about declaring
her innocence than fighting copyright infringement.102 Judge Kozinski, in his opinion, discussed the importance of Garcia disassociating herself from the film’s message.103
In discussing the type of relief Garcia might want, it is also
worth noting the type of injunction that was originally issued. The
court directed Google to “take down all copies of Innocence of Muslims from YouTube and any other platforms within its control and
to take all reasonable steps to prevent further uploads.”104 As a result, Google will have to patrol its sites to ensure that the film
96

Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 947 (Smith, J. dissenting).
See id. at 938–39 (majority opinion) (arguing that YouTube is so prominent that
removing it from the platform will curb the harm).
98
See Kovaleski & Barnes, supra note 6.
99
See id.
100
See id.
101
See Gross, supra note 4.
102
See id.
103
Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929, 939 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir.
2015).
104
See id. at 940.
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would not be uploaded in the future. It is unlikely that Garcia
would receive as broad a mandatory injunction against Youssef as
she received against Google. Google has the resources to comply
with that injunction and Youssef does not. If Garcia were to convince a court to transfer the film’s copyright interest to her as a
remedy, she would still have to submit DMCA takedown notices.105 Where, as here, it appears that the burden is on Google to
keep the film off its platforms.
It is also worth addressing here the relationship between a
broad injunction order, like the one in Garcia I, and the role of the
safe harbor provisions of the DMCA, discussed below.106 Some
might argue that the purpose of the DMCA takedown notice construct was to put the takedown requests in the hands of those
whose copyrights are being infringed.107 Thus, Judge Kozinski’s
order might conflict with the DMCA.108
B. Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Takedown Notices
The DMCA, enacted in 1998, created safe harbors to protect
Internet service providers (“ISP”) or online service providers from
the liability of infringing content.109 Under the DMCA, an ISP is
defined as a “provider of online services or network access, or the
operator of facilities therefor.”110 The DMCA was created to
“provide certainty for copyright owners and Internet service providers with respect to copyright infringement liability online.”111
The notice and takedown provision in the DMCA creates a safe
harbor for ISPs. In order to be exempt from liability, an ISP is required to respond “expeditiously” “to notices of copyright infringement by removing hosted content, or links to content, when

105

See infra Part II.B. for a discussion on DMCA takedown notices.
See infra notes 109–17.
107
See Parloff, supra note 67.
108
See id.
109
See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2010); Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233 (2009). It also criminalized technology created to circumvent
measures that control access to digital content (digital rights management).
110
17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(B).
111
See Lee, supra note 109, at 243.
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they receive a notice alleging copyright infringement.”112 Additionally, there is a condition that the ISP must not have actual or constructive knowledge of the infringement before receiving the notice.113 Therefore, companies, like Google, must adhere to guidelines and create policies that quickly block access to or remove infringing material once they receive notice from a copyright holder.114
Submitting a takedown notice is a useful method for a victim of
copyright infringement to protect her copyrights without having to
seek legal advice, especially if she has not registered the copyright
with the Copyright Office before the infringement occurred. A
DMCA takedown request does not require the content to be copyrighted in order to process the takedown.115
However, the process is not without its complications. Simply
put, once a copyright owner has found infringing material, she
submits a takedown notice to the ISP identifying the infringing
work.116 If the alleged infringer feels that he was using the work legally or that the removal was a mistake, the infringer can submit a
counter notice to the ISP and the ISP will repost the work.117 At
that point, the copyright owner’s only recourse is to file a lawsuit
asking the court for an injunction.118
C. Garcia Should Have Pursued a Tort Claim in State Court
If Garcia decided not to bring a copyright infringement claim
against Youssef and Google in federal court, she could have attempted to bring a lawsuit against Youssef in state court for tort

112

Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects?” Takedown
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 624 (2006); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).
113
§ 512(c)(1).
114
See Lee, supra note 109, at 233.
115
What is a DMCA Takedown?, DMCA.COM, http://www.dmca.com/FAQ/What-isa-DMCA-Takedown [http://perma.cc/ACT7-E96K] (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).
116
See Carolyn E. Wright, Two Easy Steps for Using the DMCA Takedown Notice to Battle
Copyright Infringement, NAT’L PRESS PHOTOGRAPHERS ASS’N, https://nppa.org/page/
5617 [http://perma.cc/F262-TKWK] (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).
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See id.
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See id.
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claims. Those claims would most likely be fraud, right of publicity,
invasion of privacy, or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Generally, the standard for granting a preliminary injunction is
“the likelihood the moving party ultimately will prevail on the merits, and the relative interim harm to the parties from the issuance
or nonissuance of the injunction.”119 Garcia’s best hope would be
to have the court grant a preliminary injunction, forcing Youssef to
both remove the videos he uploaded and prohibiting him from distributing the film in the future. If Garcia prevailed in a tort lawsuit,
the court might also be able to grant Garcia the copyright interest
in the work, which ultimately would give her the opportunity (or
the burden) to submit DMCA takedown requests where she saw
fit.
D. Issues Created from Suing Youssef Alone
If Garcia were able to receive a court injunction against Youssef
alone for a tort claim, such as emotional distress, in state court, she
would be unable to apply the injunction directly against Google or
any content-hosting website. This is significant because it would be
most efficient to go straight to the website that hosts the video in
order to get it removed. Or, alternatively, the person against whom
the injunction is sought might violate the court’s orders. However,
for the following reasons, it is important to note that simply because Youssef receives an order by the court requiring him to take
down the video, does not mean Google or any other contenthosting website has to comply with that order.
1. Google Not Liable Under Section 230
Google, as an online host, is not liable for the third-party content provided by the creator or speaker; here, defendant Youssef.120
The Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C § 230, states that
“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
119

See Hunt v. Superior Court, 987 P.2d 705, 716 (Cal. 1999).
See generally Brief for Public Citizen as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party,
Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-57302); see also Brief for Floor64, Inc. and
Organization for Transformative Works as Amici Curiae Supporting DefendantsAppellees, Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302). While the court did not directly address
section 230, many of the amicus briefs felt that its ruling may greatly affect the statute.
120
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treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.”121 Therefore, the provider
of an “interactive computer service” that publishes information,
but is not the provider of the information content, cannot be held
liable for the resulting tort.122 Congress’ goal in enacting section 230 was to “promote the free exchange of information and
ideas over the Internet” and to encourage online hosts to police
themselves.123 The Act’s purpose was to protect online Internet
publishers and social networks from those limiting free expression.
Here, Youssef willingly provided the content (the film) and, therefore, Google should receive full immunity.124
However, section 230 does not provide immunity to ISPs from
“laws pertaining to intellectual property.”125 Therefore, while
Google would have immunity against not removing defamatory or
fraudulent claims, for example, it only has this protection against
non-intellectual property claims.126 This is seemingly an important
reason Garcia chose to pursue a copyright lawsuit in federal court
in order to bring Google into the lawsuit.127 Presumably, if Garcia
had attempted to bring a non-intellectual property claim against
Google, it would have been blocked by section 230.128
2. Enforcing an Injunction Against a Third-Party
Blockowicz v. Williams demonstrated that an Internet publisher
website cannot be compelled to remove material by an injunction
that was issued in a proceeding where the publisher was not a party.129 The Blockowiczs had secured an injunction against defendants requiring them to remove defamatory statements from sever121

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2010).
See Ken S. Meyers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications Decency Act to
Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163, 178 (2006).
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See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003).
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See id. at 1124.
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47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).
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See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 (9th Cir. 2007).
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See Brief for Internet Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting DefendantsAppellees, supra note 76. Perfect 10 also states that section 230’s reference to “intellectual
property” only means “federal intellectual property.” Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1119.
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al websites, but defendants never responded.130 Every website removed the statements except for www.ripoffreport.com operated
by Xcentric.131 The plaintiffs asked the court to compel Xcentric to
remove the statements by enforcing the injunction against Xcentric
through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2)(C).132 The
Blockowiczs could not sue Xcentric directly because of section 230
immunity. Rule 65(d)(2)(C) allows courts to enforce injunctions
against “third parties who have ‘actual notice’ of the injunction,
and ‘who are in active concert or participation’ with the parties
bound by the injunction.”133 The court held that Xcentric does not
fit within Rule 65(d)(2)(c) because actions that aid and abet must
occur after the injunction is imposed so nonparties have “actual
notice” of the injunction.134 The court also noted in its opinion that
the Blockowiczs’s only relief may be a contempt charge against the
original defendants for not complying with the injunction, and that
it would not be possible to enforce an injunction against Xcentric in
this way.135 Garcia I and Garcia II are similar to Blockowicz, in that
Garcia, if she received an injunction solely against Youssef, would
be unable to enforce the injunction against Google.
E. Websites Voluntarily Removing Content and Complying With
Injunctions
Most online Internet publishers are generally willing to remove
infringing content when a court orders an injunction against the
content creator on its own accord.136 If the court had ruled that
Youssef needed to take the film down, it is likely that Google may
have assisted Garcia if she had run into any serious problems despite no legal authority requiring them to do so.137 Google has a
webpage where it assists users with submitting legal removal requests, injunctions, and other documents because of content that
130

See id. at 565.
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Id. at 567.
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See id. at 569–70.
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See generally Blockowicz, 630 F.3d 563 (noting where all other websites removed
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either violates their terms of service or the law.138 Google’s decision to block access to the video in Egypt and Libya (without completely removing it from their website) could be viewed positively
in that Google was willing to stop the screening of offensive material by minimizing viewership of the video.139
On the other hand, Google’s decision to take down the material, unless it comes directly from a court order is purely discretionary. Innocence of Muslims was removed only in response to violence and the company said its decision was unusual and “made
because of the exceptional circumstances.”140 Notably, Google had
determined the video “was not hate speech.”141 Ultimately,
Google wants to do what is best in order to protect free speech,
while simultaneously acting in the best interest of the company. In
response to the protests over the video, Eric Schmidt, Google’s
chairman, said: “Google has a fairly clear view of this, which is that
we believe that the answer to bad speech is more speech.”142
Where Google is defining what hate speech is (speech against individuals, not against groups)143 and protecting itself and its users
from censorship, there will be situations where content that should
be removed, will not be because of section 230. No plaintiff can
safely rely on an Internet publisher to remove all content voluntarily.
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BEYOND GARCIA I AND GARCIA II: THE CURRENT
LANDSCAPE
The goal of copyright is to give authors an incentive to create144
by rewarding certain authors for their creations with exclusive enforceable rights. As in Garcia I, copyright is increasingly being used
for the purpose of removing content from the Internet, when the
plaintiff disagrees with or has been damaged by the content. Lawsuits that should be centered on claims of contract disputes transform into copyright lawsuits. In Garcia I, the plaintiff was not motivated by the incentive to create; rather her lawsuit was based on
“ex-post incentives to claim copyright.”145 Essentially, plaintiffs,
like Garcia, are using federal copyright law as a workaround to
avoid section 230 blocking state tort law claims.
III.

In Garcia II, the Ninth Circuit used the example of Bollea v.
Gawker Media146 to demonstrate how plaintiffs pursue copyright
claims to suppress derogatory material and not with the actual intent of protecting their intellectual property rights.147 In Bollea, the
wrestler Hulk Hogan sought an order requiring defendants to remove a sex tape from its website, claiming copyright infringement.
The court held that the plaintiff “produced no evidence demonstrating that he will suffer irreparable harm in the copyright sense
absent a preliminary injunction.”148 Discussed below are several
other examples that push the parameters of copyright.
A. Using Copyright to Remove Content: Revenge Porn
In August of 2014, hackers leaked hundreds of nude photographs of celebrities onto the Internet.149 The source of these pho144

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
See Clark D. Asay, Ex Post Incentives and IP in Garcia v. Google and Beyond, 67 STAN.
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tos was believed to be a breach in Apple’s iCloud system, a service
where users can store data remotely. The photos were initially uploaded to social networking websites and forum boards, such as
4Chan and Reddit, and quickly spread across the Internet. If celebrities took the photos themselves, they could, as copyright holders
of the photos, file DMCA takedown notices to possibly get the
photos removed from the website. In the event that the attempt to
have the photos removed through takedown notices is ignored, the
celebrity could then bring a lawsuit in order to have the photographs taken down.
While this strategy may be helpful in getting nude photographs
and pornography removed from less reputable websites,150 there
are several challenges celebrities may run up against while attempting to employ this legal strategy. For instance, celebrities may have
to prove that they are the copyright holder of the picture, such as
that he or she took the photo. Search engines like Google generally
only remove URLs from the search engines when they receive a
valid notice of copyright infringement.151 Also, once a celebrity
does file a DMCA takedown notice and succeeds in removing the
infringing photo from one website, another photo could still
emerge on the same or another website.152 “Fighting this fire
through DMCA is akin to playing digital whack-a-mole.”153
Similarly, celebrities are not alone in experiencing the same
frustration at being unable to find a legal method to have the nude
photos or sexually explicit material removed from the Internet.
150

Kadeen Griffiths, Jennifer Lawrence’s Nude Pic Lawsuit Allegedly Hits a Copyright
Snag That Will Horrify You, BUSTLE (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.bustle.com/articles/
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claims).
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“Nonconsensual pornography,” also known as “revenge porn,” is
the “distribution of sexually graphic images of individuals without
their consent.”154 Typically the images are created during an intimate relationship, and then are later uploaded by ex-partners.155
The victims may have more difficulty in asserting that the copyright in their photo or “selfie” was violated, due to the fact that
non-celebrities do not have the same resources as celebrities to
pursue a lawsuit and the types of websites that host revenge porn
tend to ignore victims’ requests.156 However, many believe that
DMCA takedown notices are a good tool for victims to force websites that specialize in hosting revenge porn to accept liability.157
Some legal scholars have gone even further and suggested that
victims of revenge porn should be joint “authors of their own performances.”158 By making victims of revenge porn joint authors of
their own performance, victims would be given a copyright interest
in the photo and would avoid the problem of proving that they are,
in fact, the copyright holder. However, this change would greatly
change the meaning of “joint author” in copyright law, or otherwise make revenge porn its own exception to section 230.159
As of 2015, twenty-four states have passed some form of revenge porn legislation criminalizing revenge porn160 and establish-
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155
See id.
156
See id. at 360.
157
See Amanda Levenowski, Our Best Weapon Against Revenge Porn: Copyright Law?,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/02/
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SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 237 (2013) (quoting Derek Bambauer, Beating Revenge Porn with
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(2014).
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congress-set-to-examine-revenge-porn [http://perma.cc/34HQ-V4ZT].

486

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:463

ing penalties of jail time, fines, and restitution.161 Activists, such as
Professor Mary Anne Franks, are helping to draft a federal criminal
revenge porn law, which would specifically act as a workaround of
section 230, because section 230 does not “trump federal criminal
law.”162 Furthermore, once federal revenge porn law has been
enacted, websites, like Google, would become liable.163 Still there
are those who believe these laws may be overbroad and that the
availability of tort law against the initial poster and copyright law
against the website is a sufficient means of redress for victims.164
Regardless, nonconsensual pornography has shown that copyright law has been useful to take down speech that should not be on
the Internet. Obviously, nonconsensual pornography is an awful
and emotionally damaging problem that needs to be solved. It has
to be asked, however, whether copyright is the best means to aid
victims, both celebrities and non-celebrities, or whether they
should have another medium through which they can seek legal
remedy. An alternative solution would be for more states to criminalize revenge porn or for section 230 to be adapted to allow greater flexibility for laws, such as privacy or intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
B. Using Copyright to Remove Content: Suppression of “Negative”
Information
Often individuals want certain data removed from the Internet
that they feel violates their privacy, is untrue or wrong, or is defamatory. The data might be information that hurts the individual
from attaining employment, private images that he or she did not
want shared,165 or past criminal convictions. Regularly, businesses
161
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want to remove content from websites that criticize their products
and services because it is hurting their reputation.166 Businesses
blame consumer-review websites, such as Yelp, for dips in profits
and sales when they receive negative reviews. Sometimes negative
reviews are bad for businesses.167 Yelp attracts around 120 million
visitors a month and has more than 50 million customer-generated
reviews.168
Section 230 protects certain consumer review websites, like
Yelp, from defamatory and untrue statements made by users.169
Therefore, these businesses may be forced to go after the individuals themselves, many of whom are anonymous, in order to remove
defamatory posts. Yelp receives six subpoenas monthly, some of
which require the website to turn over the true identities of anonymous reviewers.170 When a lawsuit is filed, the business rarely
wins the lawsuits against a consumer over a defamatory review.171
Businesses have used copyright law against a website to bring
down a negative post. Sometimes they claim that the poster has
misappropriated their intellectual property (something from their
website, press release, or photo) into their post and they want the
post taken down. While this might work against a large company
processing thousands of DMCA copyright requests,172 it will likely
not work in front of a federal judge who understands a fair use de166
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fense.173 For example, in order to work around section 230, one
business attempted to have consumers sign over their intellectual
property rights in their potential future consumer reviews. Medical
Justice provided doctors and dentists, like Dr. Ken Cirka, with a
“mutual privacy agreement.”174 The form had “patients waive
their rights to post online reviews of the doctor”175 in exchange for
greater privacy protection from the doctors. Dr. Circka was unable
to remove a negative post directly from Yelp despite the agreement176 and his assertions that he owned a copyright interest in the
post. Medical Justice, as well, hasn’t been successful with its “ex
ante customer gag order.”177
Businesses are attempting to suppress information as consumer
reviewing websites like Yelp become more popular. Forcing a consumer or a patient to sign over her intellectual property right is unethical because it chills speech and a consumer or patient may feel
it is the only way for her to receive exceptional service or care.
However, similar to the above mentioned revenge porn victims, it
may be a useful tool for an individual who needs a defamatory review removed from a website and has run out of legal options.
C. Potential Solutions
Some might say that creating a copyright infringement claim
instead of using state tort law is an abuse of copyright law and an
extreme method for silencing free speech that violates First
Amendment rights. Others might argue that copyright law is a useful tool for victims who can find no other legal alternative. Regardless, plaintiffs, like Garcia, should still have the means to bring the
appropriate lawsuit and pursue remedies. Alternative legal methods exist that may provide these individuals relief if pursued.
173
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However, the benefits of implementing a new statute or industry
standard must be weighed against the harms.
First, states individually could create their own criminal laws,
targeting the individuals responsible for the individual harm. For
example, states are increasingly introducing bills to make posting
revenge porn a felony.178 This would take the burden away from the
Internet publisher and could more effectively deter culprits.179
Additionally, Internet publishers and ISPs could be forced to
listen more closely to the demands of their users as to what they are
and are not allowed to publish. For example, the European Union
developed the “right to be forgotten” which, in theory, allows an
individual to remove data in order to control one’s image or one’s
privacy.180 Internet publishers could delete unflattering photos or
newspaper articles containing information of old criminal arrests in
response to requests.181 This puts the burden on websites to correctly approve and remove requests, but also has the potential to
chill speech.182 Conversely, we could also encourage more speech,
in order to drown out the offending speech.183
Intellectual property rights law, itself, could be stretched to include these extremely rare, special cases and violations. In Garcia I,
there existed a tension between the Copyright Office asserting that
an actor cannot be an author in her performance and the majority
court arguing the opposite.184 If we allow for this wiggle room, then
actors and victims, like Garcia, would not be taken advantage off.
178
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Even Judge Kozinski found that this would rarely occur,185 so this
type of legal argument would not be able to be used very often. On
the other hand, the court has to consider the can of worms it might
open by tweaking definitions within copyright law and the types of
new claims others may bring. It might be difficult to draw a line in
order to find what types of plaintiffs can find relief in copyright law.
During the oral arguments, Judge Kozinski introduced the idea
that the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances186 could be a
solution. “The treaty endows performers with exclusive rights over
when and how their recorded performances can be copied, distributed or otherwise made available to the public,” as well as providing moral rights.187 While it may give Garcia a copyright in her performance, however, the treaty has yet to be ratified or become effective.188
Lastly, another option is that plaintiffs could be granted stronger arguments or claims when bringing lawsuits enforcing other
rights. For example, victims could be allowed to have a stronger
claim when they bring lawsuits claiming that they have suffered an
invasion of privacy.189
CONCLUSION
With the growing expansion of the Internet, individuals are
more often finding themselves unable to control their presence online. As demonstrated by the dissemination of non-consenting, explicit photographs of women being posted online, which became
newsworthy in 2014 when celebrities were affected. Similarly,
businesses have been attempting to control their reputations from
185
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being affected by negative often anonymous, and potentially untrue, online reviews. Likewise, in Garcia I, actors were deceived
into playing roles in an anti-Islamic film.190 There are other examples, but these are a few prominent illustrations.
In the absence of a law that directly provides plaintiffs or victims the relief they desire, such as the removal of the content from
the Internet, individuals have increasingly turned to copyright law.
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act protects Internet
publishers, such as Google, from the kinds of claims individuals
could be bringing (defamation, privacy, fraud, right of publicity,
etc.). However, individuals can still bring lawsuits alleging that
their intellectual property rights were violated. It is the protection
for Internet publishers that section 230 provides that directs the
individuals to this legal strategy.
Garcia should have pursued other legal methods in her lawsuit
against Youssef, the film’s producer, and should not have initiated
a copyright lawsuit against Google. The order to take down the film
was broad. Garcia naturally would not get the exact same results
against an individual as against a behemoth company like Google.
Her lawsuit was understandable given the legal strategies that are
available to her and similarly situated plaintiffs at the time. However, her harm was one that would be better suited to a resolution by
privacy law, not copyright law.
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